Moreover, the initial objectives would be achieved without a wider conflict, even though escalation may be China's response.Ĭontrast this with Ukraine, the best example of salami tactics today. If, for some reason, America perceived China's reclamation as a direct and immediate threat, the US could render those islands inoperable without difficulty. The regime makes sure that while these actions are sufficient in scope to get the world's attention, they are not severe enough to incur a decisive response.įinally, unlike many flashpoints, America's military options in the SCS are not especially limited. North Korea's provocations are innumerate, but they are carefully measured. This is not salami slicing but expressly challenging the only constraint is American power, not American wrath.Īgain, there are plenty of alternative examples for comparison. Its island reclamation activities have total disregard for how the US might respond, with Beijing taking as given that Washington will cede the strategic space.
With regard to the second requirement, there is remarkably little evidence that China is carefully calibrating. The US has explicitly included these islands in its alliance commitment to Japan, therefore the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute would meet this first criterion. A modern comparator is the Senkaku islands. There isn't any slicing – China claims the whole of the SCS and is taking strategic steps to enforce that claim.Ĭontrast this with say, the Berlin blockade, where the Soviet Union was overtly attempting to 'slice' a piece of influence, and it's immediately apparent the SCS is quite different. In the case of the latter, the concerns are expressed in terms of freedom of navigation and the rule of law. įirst, while the SCS is claimed by China as sovereign territory, it is not by the US. and effective military options without serious escalation are clearly limited.the aggressor must deliberately calibrate provocations below the thresholds of opposing actors.a strategic interest must be contested by two or more opposing actors.To my mind, there are three pre-conditions that need be met for a salami strategy to be employed: This challenges a consensus, and requires a substantive explanation. In my view China is not employing salami tactics at all, but rather a wholly different strategy. Indeed, the depiction of China's approach in the SCS as 'salami tactics' is now a widely accepted norm. Here on The Interpreter, Derek Lundy eloquently explained what is meant by this (though none will eclipse this gem from Yes Prime Minister). In recent years a number of high profile strategists have described China's South China Sea (SCS) encroachment as 'salami tactics'. In order to determine how the US may effectively respond, China's strategy must be understood.
Failure to do so will further weaken America's credibility, and undermine the rules-based order it seeks to preserve. The Permanent Court of Arbitration's decision places more pressure on the US than China, as Washington must now act to support this emphatic judgement.
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